Know how much of your borrower's covenant EBITDA you can actually check.
UMFR resolves the operative definition across every amendment, recomputes the compliance certificate, and tells you — term by term, with page and quotation — what no one outside the deal can recompute. In the median agreement we measured, that was 79% of the terms the definition sends outside the agreement. No model decides a number.
GoDaddy — Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement (15 Feb 2017) as amended through the Tenth Amendment Agreement dated as of 22 Jan 2024, filed in marked form as Annex A to that amendment (Exhibit 10.1 to GoDaddy Inc.'s 8-K filed 23 Jan 2024)
- 24 counted terms · 19 non-recomputable (79%)
- 195 defined terms reached
- 24 of 24 quotations found on the page they cite
- 8 schedules cited · 0 attached
A report on a public exhibit; it describes the text of the agreement and is not a finding about the borrower.
The questions a credit team asks
Five questions every credit review turns on. Each one maps to a surface you can open and read — a directory of evidence, not a promise.
Two of the five run end-to-end on the package a lender sends us — Definition and Arithmetic. The other three run on public filings, and the reason each is not yet reachable on private documents is named below.
Is every material item accounted for — and does the tool say what it did not verify?
The coverage statement resolves every material item into one of five coverage states, and states what it did not verify as clearly as what it did.
See the coverage statement→Does the covenant math follow the agreement's own definitions?
Covenant-defined EBITDA recomputed against the credit agreement's own definition, term by term — and how much of it a lender cannot independently recompute.
See the covenant card→Does the pledged asset exist, and exist once?
The arithmetic that catches a double pledge — several claims summing past the value of the pool behind them — shown on a reconstructed public case. Detecting the same asset pledged across different lenders needs a cross-lender record, which public data cannot provide; this is the mechanic, not that detection.
See the register lens→Do the documents hold together — and agree with one another?
The same figure reconciled across two documents — a clean pair stays silent, a disagreeing one is surfaced for review.
See cross-document reconciliation→Do the reported numbers actually recompute?
A full series of executed compliance certificates recomputed from the borrower's own components — reconciled, or declined, never guessed.
See the compliance-cert recheck→Proven on real public data — across how credit reporting fails
Compliance-certificate recheck
We ran every one of the twenty consecutive quarters of Flow International's executed compliance certificates available on EDGAR — the whole series, not a chosen window. All twenty reconcile: the recomputed leverage ratio matches the borrower's own stated figure in every quarter, across ratios moving from 0.13 to 3.03, and every quarter sits within its own stated covenant maximum — including the crisis-era quarter recomputed at 3.03 against a cap the lender had widened to 3.25x. On eighteen of the twenty the EBITDA build-up re-sums to the stated figure as well; the other two use different add-back labels, and the engine leaves that build-up un-recomputed rather than summing a partial set. Every outcome is committed as a fixture.
Synchronoss
The whole deterministic-public battery on one issuer's own public filings — a real, publicly-adjudicated collapse next to a clean baseline. On Synchronoss Technologies (SEC-adjudicated, $12.5Mpenalty), the engine surfaced that later filings restated previously reported figures for the same fiscal years — revenue FY2015 revised down 35.6% ($578.8M to $372.6M), net income down 92.3%— a material self-disclosed revision, surfaced deterministically. Beside it, a clean public issuer: the same battery, no restatement surfaced. The difference is the signal.
First Brands
From First Brands' public Chapter 11 filing alone, UMFR's engine establishes from the filing a debt floor of $8.4B and reconstructs a ceiling of $10.7B— the gap driven by ~$2.3B of factoring disclosed only in prose, invisible to a headline reader (+27.2%floor to ceiling). Read from source or computed from it. Per the court-appointed examiner's report (filed April 27, 2026), factoring lenders were owed about $2.3Bat filing — external corroboration of the scale the engine surfaces from public documents alone. First Brands' founders were separately charged by the DOJ (SDNY, January 2026; not adjudicated).We do not claim to have predicted the fraud. We claim something more useful: the verification that would have surfaced it was mechanically possible, on documents lenders already had — and no one was positioned to run it.
How it works
Recompute
Every figure is read from its source or computed deterministically from figures read there.
Quote
Each term the share counts is printed with the reason it is or is not recomputable and, where the reader matched its text, a quotation from the agreement with the page it sits on or the reason a page cannot be given.
Decline
What cannot be computed is declined rather than estimated.
One engine, six layers
Verification is the foundation, not the whole building — the first of six modules, and where the build has to begin. A verified record makes reconciliation possible; reconciliation makes re-verification worth scheduling; a scheduled record is what a shared layer can later be built on. VERIFY is the wedge; UMFR is building the infrastructure layer for private credit, and verification is module one.
Independently recompute what borrowers report against the documents that govern them.
Coverage across accounting standards and jurisdictions: US GAAP (EDGAR) and IFRS (EDGAR 20-F/40-F; EU/UK ESEF by LEI).
Phase 0, one facility: the borrower commits that each pledged asset backs that facility alone, recorded as a hash; no matching and no registry, and a refusal to sign is itself information. Then, inside one lending group: reconcile liens and pledges across the group's own facilities so one asset cannot quietly back two of them. Later, a shared record across lenders keyed to external identifiers.
Turn verified data into the regulatory and compliance reporting lenders and insurers produce: NAIC rationale packs first; AIFMD II and Form PF later.
First product: the figure check and the receipt check, as an API and an MCP server. Every answer carries a receipt; a decline names its reason. Design partners first.
— any instrument (a loan, a note, a receivables pool, a tokenized claim) changes hands with its verified history, inside venues run by others. UMFR does not operate a venue.
Detectors get copied; institutions compound.
Private credit holds about $3 trillion on industry definitions (AIMA/ACC); the FSB counts $1.5–2.0 trillion at end-2024 (Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit, 6 May 2026). In 2025 it posted a record 9.2% default rate on Fitch's measure (reported March 2026).
As of 2026, several entrants now stake out this ground. The field is contested, not empty. Setpoint and Cascade Debt both build verification infrastructure for private credit — and both work at the collateral and loan-tape layer: validating the asset pool a borrower submits, checking pledged collateral, reconciling loan-level data against supporting files. That layer matters. UMFR works at a different one: it verifies the issuer's own reported financials, recomputed from the public source directly — not from a tape the borrower chose to submit — and commits publicly to deterministic verification with no language model in its output. Independent, at the issuer level, reproducible by anyone.
At the document tier — on the source agreements public data does not carry — UMFR recomputes covenant-defined EBITDA against the credit agreement's own definition, and states how much of a borrower's covenant headroom rests on management-certified figures that cannot be independently recomputed.
The name is the destination: UMFR stands for Universal Market for Financial Rights, a market where any financial claim changes hands on evidence rather than on assurance. UMFR builds the evidence; the venues are run by others.
Who it's for
Lenders & credit funds
Direct lenders and credit funds verifying collateral and borrower reporting before they commit — and monitoring it after.
Insurers & allocators
PE-owned insurers and institutional allocators who must now demonstrate independent diligence as regulators tighten (NAIC's framework takes effect in 2026).
Fund administrators & advisors
Fund administrators, ODD teams, and lenders' counsel who run diligence on others' behalf and need a verifiable, repeatable record.
Reported and verified are not the same thing. UMFR is the independent verification layer for private credit.